Proportional Representation and Other Electoral Issues
Is anything wrong with our current ways of electing representatives to parliament or provincial legislatures? A lot of people seem to think there is.
Proportional Representation - Boon or Bane?
British Columbia is considering adopting some form of proportional representation [PR], and some members of parliament are publicly supporting similar measures to govern federal elections. The supporters of these efforts to change the system argue that the adoption of PR will help to rekindle voter interest and reduce voter apathy.
Why does PR appeal to people? The primary reason is that the old standard rule [sometimes called "first-past-the-post'] means that a minority of those who vote in a constituency or riding often elect a member of a federal or provincial legislature, ignoring the wishes of the majority of voters. First-past-the-post [FPTP] rules developed in countries such as Britain to serve the election of candidates at a time when political parties had not become the dominant political force they are today. Today, without endorsation by a political party, it is practically impossible for a candidate to gain election. Political parties now so dominate politics and our legislatures that they have made the term "representative" meaningless. No elected person can safely risk alienating the party that endorsed him by voting to express the views of his constituents where those views run contrary to the received wisdom of policy dictated by the party's leadership. Consequently, elected members of legislatures only actually represent the views of their parties, at best, and of the leadership of those parties, at worst.
PR rules, on the other hand, appear to provide a way for most of the voters to participate in an election and have a real impact on the ability of political parties they support to appoint their members to legislatures. A form of modified PR can be adopted that allows a person to be elected at the riding level, but also permits the votes for other political parties [and/or candidates endorsed by them] to be allocated to those parties, permitting the party leadership to select persons from a prior list to become members of a legislature, providing the total number of votes for the party exceeds some pre-determined minimum. This is a form that has been adopted in other countries. Such a reform to our election system would likely result in members of new, small or just regional political parties gaining appointment to legislatures. It would bring about a broader representation of the views of more voters in our legislatures. Many people will see this as a valid reason to support the adoption of some form of PR in Canada.
Some worry that PR could also mean fragmentation of the composition of legislatures into parties that may not attain an overall majority, resulting in the need for coalition governments. That is, indeed, possible. But, again, many countries with PR-based systems and only minority legislative parties, have been successfully governed by coalitions.
Since PR could result in the election or appointment of candidates and parties representing a wider range of political opinions and of the voters supporting those opinions, and this is seen by most observers as a benefit and a broadening of democracy, and might result in greater voter interest and participation, are there any downsides or disadvantages to PR that might limit the hoped-for broader democracy?
The functioning and mechanics of PR systems in Europe are quite complex and difficult for voters to understand. There is a view that this has led to greater voter apathy and low voter turnout. It is possible that voters have realized that PR systems can actually perpetuate the survival and longevity of political parties and their top leadership. Under a PR system the ability voters had under FPTP to defeat unpopular cabinet ministers and politicians will be gone. Instead, the party hierarchy will be able to appoint friends and favourites to legislatures, even should they be unpopular with voters. Local candidates will become less important, as will local issues and concerns. Party discipline will be strengthened and dissenting views will not be tolerated. Under the current system, issues of party discipline and dissent are significant. It will likely become worse if PR is adopted. As party leaderships become more remote from voters, so may their decisions become less responsive to voter wishes and opinions. Should coalition governments become necessary and normal, so might the real policy choices presented to the voters be reduced or homogenized, leaving governing coalition leaderships in control of a virtual dictatorship.
Other Factors Which Do Not Create Voter Confidence
To be fair, the trend towards a virtual dictatorship exists federally in Canada under the current FPTP system. The life of the virtual one-party system that exists in federal Canada seems to have no end in sight. Many Canadians have watched this trend develop or hear descriptions of cronyism in the allotment of high-paying political appointments, or learn of other examples of corruption and mismanagement and waste of taxpayers' dollars. At the same time, voter turnouts have been falling at elections in many jurisdictions.
Another example of politicians' readiness to benefit themselves or their parties at the expense of taxpayers is the development and spread of taxpayer financing of political parties and electioneering.
Prior to 1996 the Saskatchewan Conservative and New Democrat parties blithely ignored parts of the election law requiring full and clear disclosure of all sources of political donations. It took an investigation into their failings accompanied by considerable press attention to prompt the legislature to adopt more stringent reporting requirements aimed at improving disclosure and the "transparency" of the sources of political funding. The changed law has improved transparency.
However, the political parties in most jurisdictions have been falling all over themselves in their frenzy to use tax revenues to perpetuate themselves in office. Saskatchewan has had a taxpayer funded electoral subsidy system for many years. As if the current level of tax-funded election politicking in Saskatchewan was not enough [close to one-third of election expenses are paid for by our tax dollars], the parties are clamouring for more. In addition, Saskatchewan has recently created a political donation tax credit system, using more taxpayers' dollars to reimburse partisan electors for part of their donations to political parties and candidates.
Even this generous-to-a-fault system is not enough for some candidates and parties, as illustrated federally by the efforts of Bloc Quebecois politicians to work and milk the system. Some of these efforts are highly questionable, although perhaps not illegal. Under scathing criticism from Canada's Chief Electoral Officer and others, Parliament recently amended the election law to forbid what had become quaintly described as "la methode in-out", a scheme whereby normally-unpaid organizers and other volunteers for the Bloc were paid salaries or other monies subject to agreements that they would "donate" the monies back to the parties or candidates. In some cases, no actual money changed hands, just exchanges of cheques, highlighting the artificial nature of the transactions. It would be interesting to discover whether or not the organizers and other volunteers who received such "payments" considered them as true income and reported them to the tax authorities. To make matters even worse, the organizers and other volunteers were able to claim tax credit benefits as a result of the "donations". With the introduction in 2001 of political contribution tax credits in Sasksatchewan similar tactics may soon be adopted by some provincial politicians and parties. No one has ever consulted taxpayers to find out if they are happy with these gifts to politicians and political parties.
Can Anything Be Done?
In order to fix the electoral system, a much more thorough examination of it failings, and the failings of the political parties, is needed, but, perhaps more cogently, since we all know more or less what is going on and don't need a formal commision to conduct an investigation, it is obvious that we need strong mechanisms right now to defend the voter and taxpayer against politicians and political parties. I suggest the selection of independent electoral auditors general, with strong investigative powers, and adequate financing, to scrutinize our federal and provincial electoral systems, to root out corruption and conflict-of-interest. This would help to generate a vigilant and informed public, which is, of course, the best weapon against self-interest and virtual dictatorship.
Proportional Representation - Boon or Bane?
British Columbia is considering adopting some form of proportional representation [PR], and some members of parliament are publicly supporting similar measures to govern federal elections. The supporters of these efforts to change the system argue that the adoption of PR will help to rekindle voter interest and reduce voter apathy.
Why does PR appeal to people? The primary reason is that the old standard rule [sometimes called "first-past-the-post'] means that a minority of those who vote in a constituency or riding often elect a member of a federal or provincial legislature, ignoring the wishes of the majority of voters. First-past-the-post [FPTP] rules developed in countries such as Britain to serve the election of candidates at a time when political parties had not become the dominant political force they are today. Today, without endorsation by a political party, it is practically impossible for a candidate to gain election. Political parties now so dominate politics and our legislatures that they have made the term "representative" meaningless. No elected person can safely risk alienating the party that endorsed him by voting to express the views of his constituents where those views run contrary to the received wisdom of policy dictated by the party's leadership. Consequently, elected members of legislatures only actually represent the views of their parties, at best, and of the leadership of those parties, at worst.
PR rules, on the other hand, appear to provide a way for most of the voters to participate in an election and have a real impact on the ability of political parties they support to appoint their members to legislatures. A form of modified PR can be adopted that allows a person to be elected at the riding level, but also permits the votes for other political parties [and/or candidates endorsed by them] to be allocated to those parties, permitting the party leadership to select persons from a prior list to become members of a legislature, providing the total number of votes for the party exceeds some pre-determined minimum. This is a form that has been adopted in other countries. Such a reform to our election system would likely result in members of new, small or just regional political parties gaining appointment to legislatures. It would bring about a broader representation of the views of more voters in our legislatures. Many people will see this as a valid reason to support the adoption of some form of PR in Canada.
Some worry that PR could also mean fragmentation of the composition of legislatures into parties that may not attain an overall majority, resulting in the need for coalition governments. That is, indeed, possible. But, again, many countries with PR-based systems and only minority legislative parties, have been successfully governed by coalitions.
Since PR could result in the election or appointment of candidates and parties representing a wider range of political opinions and of the voters supporting those opinions, and this is seen by most observers as a benefit and a broadening of democracy, and might result in greater voter interest and participation, are there any downsides or disadvantages to PR that might limit the hoped-for broader democracy?
The functioning and mechanics of PR systems in Europe are quite complex and difficult for voters to understand. There is a view that this has led to greater voter apathy and low voter turnout. It is possible that voters have realized that PR systems can actually perpetuate the survival and longevity of political parties and their top leadership. Under a PR system the ability voters had under FPTP to defeat unpopular cabinet ministers and politicians will be gone. Instead, the party hierarchy will be able to appoint friends and favourites to legislatures, even should they be unpopular with voters. Local candidates will become less important, as will local issues and concerns. Party discipline will be strengthened and dissenting views will not be tolerated. Under the current system, issues of party discipline and dissent are significant. It will likely become worse if PR is adopted. As party leaderships become more remote from voters, so may their decisions become less responsive to voter wishes and opinions. Should coalition governments become necessary and normal, so might the real policy choices presented to the voters be reduced or homogenized, leaving governing coalition leaderships in control of a virtual dictatorship.
Other Factors Which Do Not Create Voter Confidence
To be fair, the trend towards a virtual dictatorship exists federally in Canada under the current FPTP system. The life of the virtual one-party system that exists in federal Canada seems to have no end in sight. Many Canadians have watched this trend develop or hear descriptions of cronyism in the allotment of high-paying political appointments, or learn of other examples of corruption and mismanagement and waste of taxpayers' dollars. At the same time, voter turnouts have been falling at elections in many jurisdictions.
Another example of politicians' readiness to benefit themselves or their parties at the expense of taxpayers is the development and spread of taxpayer financing of political parties and electioneering.
Prior to 1996 the Saskatchewan Conservative and New Democrat parties blithely ignored parts of the election law requiring full and clear disclosure of all sources of political donations. It took an investigation into their failings accompanied by considerable press attention to prompt the legislature to adopt more stringent reporting requirements aimed at improving disclosure and the "transparency" of the sources of political funding. The changed law has improved transparency.
However, the political parties in most jurisdictions have been falling all over themselves in their frenzy to use tax revenues to perpetuate themselves in office. Saskatchewan has had a taxpayer funded electoral subsidy system for many years. As if the current level of tax-funded election politicking in Saskatchewan was not enough [close to one-third of election expenses are paid for by our tax dollars], the parties are clamouring for more. In addition, Saskatchewan has recently created a political donation tax credit system, using more taxpayers' dollars to reimburse partisan electors for part of their donations to political parties and candidates.
Even this generous-to-a-fault system is not enough for some candidates and parties, as illustrated federally by the efforts of Bloc Quebecois politicians to work and milk the system. Some of these efforts are highly questionable, although perhaps not illegal. Under scathing criticism from Canada's Chief Electoral Officer and others, Parliament recently amended the election law to forbid what had become quaintly described as "la methode in-out", a scheme whereby normally-unpaid organizers and other volunteers for the Bloc were paid salaries or other monies subject to agreements that they would "donate" the monies back to the parties or candidates. In some cases, no actual money changed hands, just exchanges of cheques, highlighting the artificial nature of the transactions. It would be interesting to discover whether or not the organizers and other volunteers who received such "payments" considered them as true income and reported them to the tax authorities. To make matters even worse, the organizers and other volunteers were able to claim tax credit benefits as a result of the "donations". With the introduction in 2001 of political contribution tax credits in Sasksatchewan similar tactics may soon be adopted by some provincial politicians and parties. No one has ever consulted taxpayers to find out if they are happy with these gifts to politicians and political parties.
Can Anything Be Done?
In order to fix the electoral system, a much more thorough examination of it failings, and the failings of the political parties, is needed, but, perhaps more cogently, since we all know more or less what is going on and don't need a formal commision to conduct an investigation, it is obvious that we need strong mechanisms right now to defend the voter and taxpayer against politicians and political parties. I suggest the selection of independent electoral auditors general, with strong investigative powers, and adequate financing, to scrutinize our federal and provincial electoral systems, to root out corruption and conflict-of-interest. This would help to generate a vigilant and informed public, which is, of course, the best weapon against self-interest and virtual dictatorship.
posted by politicalcommentariescanada | 5:45 PM
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